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The Value of Interest Rate
Smoothing: How the Private Sector
Helps the Federal Reserve
By Jeffery D. Amato and Thomas Laubach
M
ost central banks conduct monetary
policy by setting targets for overnight
interest rates. During the 1990s, cen-
tral banks have tended to move these interest
rates in small steps without reversing direction
quickly, a practice called interest rate smoothing.
For example, the majority of Federal Reserve
policy moves in the last decade and a half have
come in a sequence of 25-basis-point moves, in
striking contrast to the early 1980s, when short-
term interest rates fluctuated widely. In light
of this historical contrast, it is natural to ask
whether interest rate smoothing is a beneficial
way to conduct monetary policy.
This article argues that interest rate smoothing
isbeneficialbecausetheprivatesectorisforward-
looking. The private sector bases its decisions on
expectationsofthefuture.Thus,amonetarypolicy
movetodaywillbemoreeffectiveifitisexpected
to persist over time. By smoothing interest rates,
the size of changes in interest rates required to
reduce fluctuations in the economy can be
smaller than would otherwise be necessary.
The first section of this article describes inter-
est rate smoothing. The second section presents
evidence that the Federal Reserve has smoothed
interest rates in the past and reviews a tradi-
tional argument that may explain this apparent
behavior. The third section offers an alternative
explanation for interest rate smoothingbased
on the forward-looking behavior of the private
sectorand provides evidence on the benefits
of smoothing.
I. WHAT IS INTEREST RATE
SMOOTHING?
Central banks can smooth interest rates at
various frequencies. For example, three frequen-
cies at which the Federal Reserve arguably has
smoothed interest rates are seasonal, event, and
day to day. Seasonal smoothing means that the
central bank eliminates all calendar patterns in
interest rates. Event smoothing means that,
when a crisis occurs that puts sudden upward
pressureoninterestrates,thecentralbankprovides
liquiditytothemarkettoavoidlargeinterestrate
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1Economistshaveprovidedevidence
that the Federal Reserve has engaged in each of
these three types of smoothing.
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The focus of this article is a fourth type of
smoothingthesmoothingofchangesinthecen-
tral banks target for the short-term interest rate.
Smoothing of this kind means that decisions about
the target explicitly depend on recent past deci-
sions about the target; that is, target changes are
purposely damped. For example, in recent years,
the Federal Reserve has typically considered
changes in its target for the federal funds rate at
regular meetings of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which occur roughly every
six weeks. But it actually changes the target rela-
tivelyinfrequently.From1994to1998,forexam-
ple, the FOMC changed the target at 12 of 40
meetings. In addition, though, the FOMC has
occasionally changed its target for the federal
funds rate between regular meetings. Whether
target changes occur at or between regular meet-
ings of the FOMC, the changes tend to be
damped. The FOMCs intentional smoothing of
itsfederalfundsratetargetoverasequenceoftar-
get changes, as opposed to damping changes in
the federal funds rate between target changes, is
the focus of this article.
There is evidence that the Federal Reserve has
engaged in this type of smoothing. To approxi-
mate the interval at which the Federal Reserve
has made target decisions, this article presents
empiricalevidencebasedonU.S.dataatmonthly
and quarterly frequencies. For example, Chart 1
plots monthly values of the federal funds rate
from January 1965 to December 1997.
3The chart
indicates that some periods are characterized by a
smooth federal funds rate path  for example, the
periodinthethirdpanel(January1987toDecem-
ber 1997). On the other hand, the federal funds
rate is less smooth from October 1979 to October
1982.
II. INTEREST RATE SMOOTHING:
EVIDENCE AND A TRADITIONAL
EXPLANATION
This section provides evidence that the Fed-
eral Reserve has pursued a policy of smoothing
and offers a traditional explanation for this
behavior.Evidenceonsmoothingtakestheform
of a federal funds rate that changes slowly over
time due largely to Federal Reserve policy. Tra-
ditionally, economists have explained this iner-
tiainthefederalfundsrateusingtheoriesthatdo
not rely on forward-looking behavior of private
agents. One of these explanations is that central
banks respond cautiously to an uncertain policy
environment.
Evidence of interest rate smoothing
Evidence of smoothing is based on two obser-
vations: First, the federal funds rate is highly
correlated over time. Second, an empirical char-
acterization of recent Federal Reserve behavior
suggests much of the observed smoothness in
the funds rate is due to the Federal Reserve
deliberately damping fluctuations in the federal
funds rate target.
Correlations of the federal funds rate. As sug-
gested in Chart 1, the federal funds rate appears
to have moved smoothly over most of the last
three decades, especially since the mid-1980s.
Several measures show how smoothly these
movements have been over this period. One
measure is the simple correlation between fed-
eral funds rates observed at different points in
time. For instance, if values of the federal funds
rate one quarter apart tend to be similar, then the
estimated correlation of federal funds rates one
quarter apart should be close to 1. A correlation
close to 1 would be consistent with interest rate
smoothing.
Chart 2 shows estimates of the correlations
between federal funds rates at various quarters
apart. The lines in the chart reflect estimates cal-
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Chart 1
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The shortest sample (1983:Q1 to 1997:Q4) corre-
sponds to the period immediately after the Federal
Reserves switch from targeting nonborrowed
reserves to targeting the federal funds rate. The
second sample (1980:Q1 to 1997:Q4) covers most
ofPaulVolckerstenureasChairmanoftheFederal
ReserveBoardandthefirsttenyearsofChairman
Greenspans tenure, a period over which the Fed-
eral Reserve pursued a disinflationary monetary
policy. The largest sample (1965:Q1 to 1997:Q4)
spans the period in which the federal funds mar-
ket has been fully operational and liquid.
Regardless of the sample period used, values of
the federal funds rate as far as six quarters apart
have a high positive correlation (that is, above
0.5). In addition, the gradual decline of the corre-
lations toward 0 implies that the path of the
interest rate exhibits substantial persistence.
4
Estimates of high positive correlations alone,
however, do not prove that the Federal Reserve
has intrinsically smoothed interest rates. Central
bankpolicycanmoveslowly,orinertially,with-
out any explicit desire to smooth interest rates.
Many factors influence how the central banks
targetisdetermined.Ifanyofthesefactorschanges
gradually over time, then that persistence may
alsocauseinterestratestochangegraduallyover
time. For example, if the Federal Reserve reacts
vigorously to inflationary impulses, but these
impulses tend to be persistent, the federal funds
rate would exhibit substantial persistence. It is
therefore necessary to determine whether the
smooth path of interest rates is due to explicit
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65Q1-97Q4
83Q1-97Q4smoothing of policy or to slowly moving factors
that influence policy. To separate an explicit
smoothing motive from other factors that may
havedeterminedthefederalfundsrate,itisneces-
sary to estimate the effect of past interest rates on
current interest rates after accounting for other
factors that influence current interest rates.
Estimates of smoothing in a reaction function.
If a central bank acts systematically, it may be
possible to capture central bank behavior in an
equationthatrelatesthevariablethatthecentral
bank controls (such as the federal funds rate)
to the goal variables about which central banks
ultimately care (inflation and output). Economists
callthisequationareactionfunction.
5Estimatesof
such an equation are presented below.
Many factors influence monetary policy. Among
the most important are inflation and output.
Accordingly, the estimated reaction functions
determine settings for the current federal funds
rate (rt) as a function of current inflation (p t),
output minus its long-run trend, or detrended out-
put (zt), and the past value of the federal funds
rate (rt-1):
(1)
where c is a constant and et is a residual term.
Thesystematiccomponentofpolicyiscaptured
by the inflation, detrended output, and lagged
interest rate terms on the right-hand side of the
equation. The coefficients a and b measure the
FederalReservesresponsetoanincreaseininfla-
tion and detrended output, respectively. The esti-
mated values of a and b are expected to be
positive. For example, an increase in inflation
should lead the Federal Reserve to increase its
federal funds rate target. Smoothing is repre-
sentedbythelaggedinterestratetermalone.High
values of the coefficient d imply a high degree of
smoothing;avalueofd equalto0meansthatpol-
icy does not involve smoothing at all.
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Theresidualaccountsforvariablesnotexplicitly
included in the reaction function that may occa-
sionally influence Federal Reserve decisions.
The residual itself, however, is not expected to
exhibit a systematic pattern.
Table 1 presents estimates of d for alternative
measures of inflation and detrended output, and
for four sample periods. (More detailed estima-
tionresults,withdiscussion,areinAppendixA.)
As mentioned above, the degree of persistence
in inflation and detrended output is potentially
important in explaining the persistence in the
federal funds rate. Two measures of each of
these variables can help assess the robustness of
estimates of equation (1). The two inflation
seriesarethepercentagechangeintheconsumer
price index less its food and energy components
(commonly referred to as core CPI) and the per-
centage change in the implicit price deflator for
nonfarm business output. The two output series
are deviations from trend in real gross domestic
product (GDP) and nonfarm business output. A
linear deterministic trend is used as a proxy for
the long-run trend for each measure of output.
7
The table presents estimates of the smoothing
coefficient for the three sample periods described
earlier in the discussion of Chart 1. It is also
helpful to consider a fourth, shorter sample
(1988:Q1to1997:Q4),whichcoversthefirstten
years of Chairman Greenspans tenure. All of
theentriesinTable1presentaclearanduniform
message: the coefficient on the lagged federal
funds rate is large (close to 1) and significantly
different than 0. This result holds, regardless of
how inflation and output are measured or which
sample period is used.
8 These estimates suggest
that the Federal Reserve purposely smoothed
interest rates in the past.
9
A traditional explanation of smoothing
behavior
The high correlations of the federal funds rate
over time provide convincing evidence that the
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, 1 t t t t t e r d z b a c r + + + + = - pfederal funds rate evolved smoothly over most of
the past three decades. The large coefficients on
the lagged interest rate term in the estimated reac-
tion functions suggest that the Federal Reserve
has intentionally followed a policy of interest
ratesmoothing.Still,theseestimatesdonotshed
light on why the Federal Reserve has smoothed
interest rates.
Economists have provided various explana-
tions why central banks smooth interest rates.
One explanation is that central banks are simply
being cautious because they have limited knowl-
edge about the economy. Brainard first argued
that, in the face of uncertainty about how the
economy works, it may be best for policymakers
to make a more muted response to new observa-
tionsofdatathaniftheyknewtheeconomystrue
structure.
10 By moving cautiously, policymakers
can avoid generating larger fluctuations in eco-
nomic outcomes.
Building on Brainards earlier contribution,
Sack argued that, if a central bank believes the
structure of the economy is constantly changing,
then the best policy strategy is to smooth interest
rate changes. Policymakers can observe (albeit,
imperfectly) the effect of recent policy actions
on the economy. They have more information
abouttheeffectofrecentlevelsoftheshort-term
interest rate than about levels that are much dif-
ferent.Themostassuredresponseistominimize
changes  that is, to smooth interest rates. This
argument implies that the coefficient on the
lagged federal funds rate in equation (1) should




As discussed in the previous section, a tradi-
tional explanation of inertia in short-term interest
rates is based on uncertainty about the economy.
More recently, economists have offered an alter-
native explanation based on the interaction of a
systematic monetary policy with a forward-
looking private sector. This section shows how
interest rate smoothing increases the potency of
monetary policy and provides evidence on how
smoothing reduces macroeconomic volatility.
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Table 1
ESTIMATES OF THE SMOOTHING COEFFICIENT IN THE REACTION
FUNCTION
Specification














, 1 t t t t t e r d z b a c r + + + + = - pWhy smoothing increases policy potency
Under interest rate smoothing, small interest
rate changes have a relatively big effect on economic
activity. This is true because a given interest rate
changehasstrongereconomiceffectsthelongerit
is expected to persist. Furthermore, systematic
monetary policy that involves interest rate smooth-
ing leads the public to expect that a given change
in short-term interest rates will be long lasting.
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The role of forward-looking behavior. Interest
ratesmoothingisattractivetopolicymakersbecause
the private sector makes decisions based in part
on its outlook for the future. Forecasts of the
future economy and, in particular, of future mon-
etary policy, affect the decisions of consumers,
investors, workers, and firms.
Consider, for example, a firm that is planning
an investment project. The firms reaction to an
increase in short-term interest rates will depend
onhowlongitexpectstheinterestrateincreaseto
persist. If it believes the interest rate increase will
be short-lived, the firms response will be muted,
whether the investment project is financed by
borrowing short term and rolling over the debt
periodically or by borrowing long term. If it bor-
rows short term, the firm would expect to be able
to roll over the debt at a lower rate in the near
future.Ifitborrowslongterm,itwouldlikelyface
largely unchanged long-term interest rates because,
with efficient markets, a temporary increase in
short-term rates would have little effect on long-
term rates. Either way, the firms financing costs
would largely be unaffected by the increase in
short-term rates, as would its decision to under-
take the investment project.
In contrast, if the firm believes the increase in
short-term interest rates will persist over time, it
mightscalebackorcanceltheinvestmentproject.
Again,thisresponsecouldoccurwhetherthefirm
was planning to finance the investment project
with short-term or long-term debt. With
short-term financing, the firm would expect to
continue paying, for some time into the future,
the higher interest rate as it rolled over its debt.
With long-term financing, the firm would likely
have to pay a higher long-term interest rate.
Accordingtotheexpectationstheoryoftheyield
curve, an increase in short-term rates that is
expected to persist will have a bigger impact on
long-term interest rates than an increase that is
not expected to persist. Thus, under either short-
term or long-term financing, the firm will likely
respondmoreaggressivelytoaincreaseinshort-
term rates that is likely to persist.
Theneedforsystematicmonetarypolicy.Fora
change in short-term interest rates to have rela-
tivelylargeeffects,economicagentsmustexpectit
to persist. A monetary policy involving interest
rate smoothing will generate expectations of per-
sistence in rates only if the smoothing is predict-
able. Asystematic monetary policy helps ensure
this predictability.
The economic benefits of smoothing are most
apparentwhenthecentralbankactssystematically
by committing itself to a rule. A rule describes
how a central bank determines a short-term inter-
est rate as a function of goal variables, such as
current and past values of inflation and output,
as well as past values of the short-term interest
rate itself. Thus, a rule is a transparent way of
conducting systematic monetary policy. Apart
from helping agents form better forecasts of
future policy, rules help ensure that central banks




to commit themselves to following a rule when
setting interest rates. Assuming that central banks
cancommitthemselvestorulesmakesiteasier
to distinguish the benefits of smoothing from a
policy that does not involve smoothing. With a
well-established rule, the private sector will
know whether or not the central bank is smooth-
ing interest rates.
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With a systematic monetary policy, interest
rate smoothing reduces macroeconomic volatility
with only small interest rate changes because
even small interest rate changes can have rela-
tively large effects on inflation and output. This
result can be seen with the aid of a small and
highly stylized economic model.
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The goals of policy. Until recently, much of the
analysis of monetary policy focused on how the
central bank can achieve a low average level of
inflation in the long run. The argument in this
article,asputforthstronglybyWoodford(1999),
is that stabilization gains can be made by con-
ducting monetary policy in a systematic way that
involves interest rate smoothing. Therefore, this
article assumes that the central bank, in addition
to pursuing a goal of a low long-run average of
inflation, aims at minimizing fluctuations in
inflation around this average. Furthermore, it is
assumed that monetary policymakers aim at min-
imizingfluctuationsinoutputaroundamaximum
sustainable, or efficient, level. The difference
between this efficient level of output and the
actual level is called the output gap.
Because nominal interest rates cannot fall
below zero, a policy aimed at a low long-run
average of inflation cannot involve a highly vari-
able interest rate. In the analysis that follows,
therefore, the goal of low interest rate variability
is added to the goals of stabilizing inflation and
output. It is important to distinguish between a
policy of low interest rate variability and one
involving interest rate smoothing. A policy may
involve very small, but short-lived, interest rate
changesthat is, interest rate variability is low,
but interest rates are not smoothed. Alternatively,
a policy may involve large and long-lived interest
rate fluctuationsthat is it involves smoothing,
but the resulting interest rate is very variable.
Adding the goal of low interest rate variability
rules out policies involving large interest rate
fluctuations, because such policies would require
a high average inflation rate, which is undesir-
able,ortheywouldrequirethenominalinterest
rate to fall below zero, which is impossible.
In practice, these assumed goals of monetary
policy are consistent with the objectives of most
central banks. For example, the Federal Reserve
Act states that the Federal Reserve shall pro-
mote effectively the goals of maximum employ-
ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates. The latter two objectives are
closely related. Nominal interest rates are equal
to the sum of real interest rates and inflation
premia, so that low average inflation rates will
lead to moderate nominal interest rates.
Evidence from simulations. The effects of
smoothingcanbeseenusinganeconomicmodel,
which is explained in detail in Appendix B. The
model embodies three relationships that explain
the behavior of inflation, output, and short-term
interest rates over time. The first relationship,
based on firms pricing decisions, states that
when high demand pushes output above its effi-
cient level, or when expectations of future infla-
tion rise, inflation today increases. The second
relationship states that firms and households
demand for goods today depends negatively on
their expectations of the long-term real interest
rate (which is the average of expected future
short-term rates less expected inflation). The
third relationship is an interest rate rule of the
kind discussed earlier, explaining how the cen-
tral bank adjusts the short-term interest rate in
response to inflation and output.
Chart 3 shows how smoothing influences the
behavior over time of inflation, the output gap,
and the short-term interest rate in response to a
positive demand shock that gradually dies out
over several quarters.
14 The solid lines in the
chart show how the economy responds under
interest rate smoothing. The top panel shows
that the interest rate response is initially small
(relative to the size of the demand shock), but
drawn out. The interest rate slowly returns to its
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Quarter after shocklong-run level after about seven quarters. As
shown in the second panel, the smaller response
of policy allows the output gap to increase in the
quarter of the shock. In subsequent quarters, a
persistently tight policy  through both contem-
poraneous and expected effects  forces the out-
put gap to turn negative and adjust slowly back to
its long-run level.
The bottom panel shows that, in the quarter of
the shock, the inflationary impact of a positive
output gap is offset by private sector expectations
of negative output gaps in the future. In subse-
quent quarters, inflation falls and then gradually
adjusts back to its long-run level. Overall, the
departures of each of the variables from their
long-run levels are small, but persistent. The
result is that business cycles and inflationary epi-
sodes are longer under a policy of smoothing,
but more importantly, less severe.
In contrast, consider a policy that does not
involve smoothing. Any inertia in short-term
interestratesisentirelyattributabletothepersis-
tenceofshocksthathittheeconomy.Thedashed
lines in Chart 3 show the behavior of the econ-
omyunderapolicywithoutsmoothinggiventhe
samedemandshockasdescribedabove.Withno
smoothing at work, the interest rate follows the
evolution of the shock, as do the output gap and
inflation since there is no smoothing at work
(Appendix B). Relative to economic perfor-
manceunderapolicyofsmoothing,shockshave
a greater impact on inflation and a similar
impact on the output gap.
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Chart 4
IMPLIED CORRELATIONS OF FEDERAL FUNDS RATES
Note: Data are correlations in the federal funds rate 1 to 10 quarters apart.
Smoothing






















correlation between the interest rate in one quar-
terwiththeinterestratesinvariousotherquarters.
The chart shows that smoothing induces much
more persistence in interest rates, as represented
by uniformly higher correlations up to seven
quarters apart.
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Under the assumption that the goals of mone-
tary policy are to stabilize inflation around some
low long-run average and output around its effi-
cient level, the simulations illustrate the benefits




smoothing, each of the variables departs from its
long-run value longer than without smoothing,
but the overall magnitude of the squared discrep-
ancies is smaller, implying a smaller variance.
Thus, there is a small tradeoff between the persis-
tence and severity of fluctuations in the economy
depending on whether interest rates are smoothed.
Nevertheless, interest rate smoothing will lead to
lower overall volatility in the economy.
Building on this intuition, the benefits of
smoothing are captured more precisely by two
setsofmeasuresofeconomicperformance(Table
2). The first set consists of the variances of infla-
tion, the output gap, and the interest rate implied
by the model under monetary policies with and
without smoothing.
17 These variances incorpo-
rate the effects over time of the demand shock
shown in Chart 3 as well as the variance of the
demand shock itself. The second set consists of
the value of the central banks objective func-
tion, again under policies with and without
smoothing. Consistent with the goals of mone-
tary policy discussed earlier, this objective func-
tion is a combination of the variances of the
variables, so policies that produce smaller val-
uesofthefunctionarepreferable(AppendixB).
As can be seen in the table, inflation and the
interest rate are much less volatile with smooth-
ing than without it, while the output gap is only
slightly more volatile. Under smoothing, infla-
tion is 37 percent less volatile and the interest
rate is 71 percent less volatile, while the output
gap is only 7 percent more volatile.
Apolicythatinvolvessmoothingisbetterthan
onewithoutitbecausethereductionsinthevari-
ances of inflation and the interest rate more than
make up for the increase in the variance of the
output gap. The value of the central bank objec-
tive function is 52 percent smaller under
smoothing. All of these results are qualitatively
similar to those from a slightly richer model that
has stronger empirical support when applied to
U.S. data (Rotemberg and Woodford). Thus,
these results suggest that interest rate smoothing
can be beneficial.
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Table 2
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WITH AND WITHOUT SMOOTHING
Variances of:
Central bank
objective function Inflation Output gap Interest rate
Smoothing .135 10.606 1.935 1.085
No smoothing .214 9.911 6.745 2.251III. SUMMARY
This article presents evidence that Federal
Reserve policy over the past three decades has
involved systematic interest rate smoothing. A
traditionalexplanationforthisbehavioristhatthe
Federal Reserve reacts cautiously in the presence
of uncertainty about the structure or the state of
the economy.
The argument for interest rate smoothing pre-
sented in this article is instead based on the for-
ward-looking nature of the private sector. With
smoothing, a policy move today has a bigger
impact because consumers and firms expect it
will last well into the future, and these expecta-
tions affect their current behavior. Simulation
results from a small, stylized model suggest that
interest rate smoothing reduces macroeconomic
fluctuations and is therefore beneficial.
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APPENDIX A
ESTIMATION OF THE REACTION FUNCTION
Thisappendixprovidesmoredetailsonthe





panels. The panels are distinguished by the
method used for estimating the long-run
trend of output. In the top panel, the long-run
trend is estimated as a deterministic linear
trend; in the bottom panel, the long-run trend
isestimatedusingtheHodrick-Prescottfilter.
As in the text, each panel presents results for
two measures of inflation and output, and for
four different sample periods.
Two sets of ordinary least squares esti-
mates of equation (1) are presented. For each
sample period, the first line shows estimates
of a, b, and d; the second line shows esti-
mates of a and b when d is restricted to be 0.
The last two columns of the panels are sum-
mary statistics: Theils adjusted coefficient
of determination (R
2
) and the Box-Ljung
Q-statistic (Q() 8 ), which tests for serial cor-
relation in the residual, et.
The estimates of d in the top panel repeat
the information in Table 1 in the text. As can
be seen in the bottom panel, the estimates of
d are insensitive to the method used for con-
structing the long-run trend of output. This
resultreinforcestheconclusionthattheFederal
Reserve smoothed interest rates in the past.
There are three striking differences
between the estimated equations when d is
estimated or is set equal to 0. One difference
isthattheestimateofthecoefficientoninfla-
tion, a, increases substantiallyin magni-
tude and statistical significancewhen d is
restricted to be 0. The highly significant esti-
mates of d, however, suggest there is not a
multicollinearity problem. The second dif-
ference is the sizes of the R
2
statistics.
Including the lagged interest rate substan-
tially improves the fit of the equation. The
third difference is the sizes of theQ() 8 statis-
tics. The large values of the statistics across
thecaseswhendissetequalto0suggestthat
neitherinflationnordetrendedoutputindividu-
ally contributes much to the persistence of the
federal funds rate. The large discrepancies
between the cases when d is estimated and
restricted to be 0 point to the difficulty in
identifying whether inertia in the federal funds
rateisduetosmoothingorseriallycorrelated
errors.However,evenwhenthelaggedinter-
est rate is included, there still appears to be
serial correlation in the error term.
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APPENDIX A - continued
B. H-P detrended output
Core CPI GDP 65Q1-97Q4 .142* .290** .850** .909 25.400**
.809** .164 --- .501 419.631**
80Q1-97Q4 .259* .196* .787** .917 16.777*
1.114** -.095 --- .637 128.482**
83Q1-97Q4 .112 .242** .878** .944 18.869**
1.199** .748* --- .523 85.261**
88Q1-97Q4 -.015 .274** .913** .952 28.315**








65Q1-97Q4 .075 .260** .894** .906 26.836**
.721** .202 --- .397 454.094**
80Q1-97Q4 .208* .226** .821** .912 19.500**
1.258** .006 --- .662 124.625**
83Q1-97Q4 .083 .220** .885** .947 16.656*
.838** .670* --- .396 121.313**
88Q1-97Q4 .073 .263** .873** .958 28.997**
.799** .759** --- .522 46.461**
** Significant at 1 percent level.
* Significant at 5 percent level.
Table A1
ESTIMATES OF THE REACTION FUNCTION





measure Sample a b d R
2
Q(8)
Core CPI GDP 65Q1-97Q4 .120 .158** .838** .899 25.370**
.788** .101 --- .499 410.881**
80Q1-97Q4 .289** .073 .778** .914 16.273*
1.111** -.088 --- .639 129.299**
83Q1-97Q4 .086 .046 .916** .935 22.442**
1.273** .155 --- .430 124.561**
88Q1-97Q4 .132 .235** .812** .958 26.187**








65Q1-97Q4 .036 .163** .871** .898 25.276**
.644** .209 --- .415 445.804**
80Q1-97Q4 .255* .104** .803** .907 17.853*
1.258** .012 --- .662 124.654**
83Q1-97Q4 .092 .059 .911** .938 20.346**
.896** .240 --- .328 140.622**
88Q1-97Q4 .1579* .176** .807** .964 24.173**
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL USED IN THE SIMULATIONS
This appendix describes the model used to
perform the simulations in the text. It first
lays out formally the objectives the central
bank seeks to achieve. It then provides the
equations of a model that captures forward-
looking behavior of the private sector. The
appendixendswithadiscussionofhowopti-
mal policy involves interest rate smoothing.
The central banks objective function
As stated in the text, this article assumes
that central banks seek to minimize the vari-
ance of inflation around a target of 0 and the
variance of the output gap ( x t). These goals
of monetary policy are captured by the fol-
lowing objective function:
(B1)
where xyy y ttt
n
t º-, is output, yt
n is the
efficient level of output, p is the long-run
average of inflation, var(.) is the uncondi-
tional variance of a variable, and l reflects
the weight the central bank puts on stabilizing




in (B1) reflects the central banks goal to
keep inflation low over the long run in addi-
tion to minimizing fluctuations in inflation.
The policy strategy that minimizes the
variancesofinflationandtheoutputgapmay
call for the central bank to induce sharp
swings in the short-term interest rate. How-
ever, monetary policy is constrained by the
fact that nominal interest rates have a lower
bound of zero. One way to reduce the chance
of hitting this bound is to generate a high
average rate of inflation. Since the nominal
interestrateisthesumoftherealinterestrate
and inflation, high inflation rates on average
will result in nominal interest rates that are
typically far away from zero. Of course, this
sort of policy runs counter to the objective of
achieving a low rate of inflation in the long
run.
Analternativewaytoexpresstheobjective
function (B1) that also explicitly recognizes
the zero lower bound for nominal interest
rates is to replacep
2




minimizing the variance of the short-term
interest rate relative to the variances of infla-
tion and the output gap. The parameter l r
should be chosen sufficiently large to mini-
mize the probability that the optimal policy
calls for the interest rate to hit its zero lower
bound.
It is important to note that adding the term
l r var(rt) to the objective function does not
automatically imply that the optimal policy
entails interest rate smoothing. This term
meansthatextremevaluesoftheinterestrate
areundesirable.However,itdoesnotruleout
a policy that completely disregards past val-
ues of the short-term interest rate.
The values ofl x andl r used in the simu-
lations in section three are shown in Table
, ) var( ) var(
2 p l p+ + t x t x
), var( ) var( ) var( t r t x t r x l l p+ +
continued...62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
B1. These values are taken from Woodford
(1999).
18
The model of the economy
The type of economy that underlies the
analysis in the text can be formalized as a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with monopolistic competition. The economy
consists of consumers who have preferences
over a continuum of goods and supply labor
in a competitive factor market. The goods
market is populated with a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms, and prices
are sticky. The equations of the model can be
derived as the result of optimizing behavior
by the private sector (Woodford 1996).
The first equation is a forward-looking
ISequation.Outputdependsonnextperiods
expectedoutput,theexanterealinterestrate,
and a demand shock (g t):
19
(B3)
where Et(.) is the conditional expectation
operator, based on information available at
time t. The parameter s
-1 is the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution.
The second equation is a New Keynes-
ian Phillips curve (aggregate supply equa-
tion). Inflation in one period is determined
by the amount of inflation expected next
period and the output gap:
(B4)
where the parameterbis the private sectors
subjective discount factor and the parameter
k is a decreasing function of the average
length of time that firms keep prices fixed
and an increasing function of the sensitivity
ofmarginalcosttochangesintheoutputgap.




the natural rate of interest (Woodford 1999).
Since the central bank seeks to stabilize fluc-
tuations in xt,rt
n is the relevant combination
of the exogenous shocks to which the central
bank wishes to react. The natural rate of
interest is modeled as an AR(1):
(B6)
where || r<1 and . For
values of r¹0, the variables of the model
exhibit persistence even in the absence of
interest rate smoothing. The values of the
parameters used in the simulations are
shown in Table B1, which are also taken
from Woodford (1999).
Solving for the optimal policy
The optimal path of interest rates can be
derived as the solution to the social planners
problem. Minimizing a Lagrangian formed
by the central banks objective function and
the models equations produces a set of
first-order conditions that characterize the
optimal path of the models three endoge-
nous variables and the two Lagrange multi-
pliers. These first order conditions involve
both current and lagged Lagrange multi-
pliers, and therefore imply that the optimal
policyinvolvessmoothing.Fordetailsonthe
, )] ( [ ) ( 1
1
1 t t t t t t t g E r y E y + - - = +
-
+ p s
, ) ( 1 t t t t x E k p b p+ = +




+ - - - = t t
n
t t t t t E r r x E x p s











t r r e r+ = -
)) var( , 0 ( ~ e e iid t
APPENDIX B - continuedENDNOTES
1Daytodaysmoothingisanaturalconsequenceofconduct-
ing policy using interest rates; otherwise it would be mean-
inglesstosayacentralbanksetsatargetfortheinterestrate.
2Forexample,economistshaveshownthatoneoftheconse-
quences of early Federal Reserve policy was the elimination
of a seasonal cycle in market interest rates due to the harvest
(Miron). Economists have also shown that, for over much of
the last three decades, the Federal Reserve has pegged the
federal funds rate for short intervals at a time (Bernanke and
Mihov).
3 The monthly data are averages of daily values of the effec-
tivefederalfundsrate,expressedasannualizedpercentages.
4 An important limitation of this method to measure
smoothness is suggested by the fact that, according to
Chart 2, the correlation of federal funds rates more than four
quarters apart are higher over the sample 1980 to 1997 than
overthesampleexcludingtheearly1980s.Visualinspection
of Chart 1 suggests exactly the opposite. The measure of
smoothing presented next avoids this problem.
5 Reaction functions are closely related to policy rules.
Rules are usually interpreted as normative prescriptions to
the central bank, whereas the reaction functions considered
hereareunderstoodasempiricaldescriptionsofpastmone-
tary policy.
6 As mentioned above, even when d is 0, the federal funds
rate may be persistent if either inflation or the output gap
evolves slowly over time. Inflation and the output gap are
driven to some extent by shocks that hit the economy. If
these shocks are persistent, then inflation and the output
gap will show persistence, which in turn induces persis-
tence in the federal funds rate. The next section presents a
model in which shocks gradually die out. Inflation and out-
put exhibit persistence that is directly attributable to the
shocks, and therefore, by responding to these variables, so
does policy.
7 The inflation series are constructed as differences in
log-levels, expressed as annualized percentages. The
detrended output series are expressed as quarterly percent-
age deviations. The federal funds rate is the quarterly aver-
age of daily values, expressed as annualized percentages.
ECONOMIC REVIEW l THIRD QUARTER 1999 63
solution to this problem, see Woodford
1999.
This article takes a slightly different
approach in comparing optimal policies with
and without smoothing. The approach here
assumes that the central bank determines pol-
icy according to an interest rate rule. Rules
withsmoothingincludealaggedinterestrate
term, whereas rules without smoothing do
not. Attention is restricted to simple rules
that include only current values of inflation
and the output gap, and in the case of smooth-
ing, the interest rate lagged one period. The
optimalvaluesfortheparametersintherules
are obtained by minimizing the objective
function (B2) subject to the models equa-
tions (B4) - (B6) and the policy rule.
APPENDIX B - continued
Table B1








lr .233Measuring inflation using the overall CPI or the GDP defla-
tor does not alter the results.
8 All of the estimates are statistically significantly greater
than 0.5, at a five percent level of significance.
9 A different explanation of the evidence presented in Table
1 is that large and positive estimates can be misleading if
equation (1) omits some important variables that influence
policy. Central banks may place no weight on past interest
rateswhensettingatargetforthecurrentinterestrate,butthe
estimate of the coefficient on the lagged interest rate term in
the reaction function may still be large if some omitted vari-
ables are serially correlated, that is, persistent. Interpreting
thelargeestimatesofdasevidenceofsmoothingistherefore
based on the assumption that no persistent variables that
affect Federal Reserve behavior systematically are omitted
from equation (1).
10Alongsimilarlines,sincetheinitialreleasesofnewobser-
vations on many variables are often subjected to many revi-
sions, it may be advisable to move cautiously until better
quality data are available.
11 This basic idea of why smoothing is beneficial dates back
to Goodfriend. It has been revived recently by Woodford
(1999).
12 John Taylor of Stanford University offered an example of
a rule that has received much attention of economists
recently.InTaylorsrule,thefederalfundsrateissetequalto
a weighted sum of four components: the long-run real inter-
estrate,inflationoverthepastyear,thedeviationofinflation
from a long-run target, and detrended output. As Taylor
acknowledges, in reality rules are too restrictive to be the
sole determinate of interest rates. Monetary policy cannot be
put on autopilot because the world is a more complicated
place than can be captured in a small model of the econ-
omy. But even if a central bank cannot strictly adopt a rule,
a rule can serve as a benchmark to guide policymaking in
the relevant direction.
13 See Appendix B for an example of a model in which it
can be proved that the best policy involves smoothing.
14 The shock is normalized to have an initial impact equal
to a 1-percent perturbation in the natural rate of interest, so





mal according to the model. This comparison is
misleading, because the historical shocks to which mone-
tarypolicyrespondedmayhavebeenmuchmorepersistent
than the shock series used in the model
16 Eventually, each variable moves towards its long-run
value of 0. The inflation target is assumed to be 0 and both
output and the efficient level of output revert to their com-
mon long-run trend (Appendix B). For convenience, the
interest rate is plotted as a deviation from its long-run
value. This long-run value is partly determined by the tar-
get around which the central bank minimizes interest rate
fluctuations, that is r*. (See equation B2 in Appendix B.)
17 Table 2 reports the unconditional variances of the vari-
ables implied by the model economy laid out in Appendix
B combined with, respectively, policies with and without
smoothing.
18 See Woodford (1999) for a discussion of these choices.
19 This description abstracts from government purchases
and net exports. Changes in each of these variables are
interpreted as demand shocks.
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